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ABSTRACT
We construct a matrix showing the share of the year 2000 population in every country that is descended
from people in different source countries in the year 1500.   Using this matrix, we analyze how post-1500
migration has influenced the level of GDP per capita and within-country income inequality in the world
today.  Indicators of early development such as early state history and the timing of transition to agriculture
have much better predictive power for current GDP when one looks at the ancestors of the people
who currently live in a country than when one considers the history on that country’s territory, without
adjusting for migration.   Measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of a country’s current population
do not predict income inequality as well as measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of the
current population’s ancestors. An even better predictor of current inequality in a country is the variance
of early development history of the country’s inhabitants, with ethnic groups originating in regions
having longer histories of agriculture and organized states tending to be at the upper end of a country’s
income distribution.  However, high within-country variance of early development also predicts higher














  Economists studying income differences among countries in the world today have 
been increasingly drawn to examine the influence of long-term historical factors.  While 
the theories underlying these analyses vary, the general finding is that things that were 
happening 500 or more years ago matter for economic outcomes today.  Hibbs and 
Olsson (2004) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005), for example, find geographic factors that 
predict the timing of the  Neolithic revolution in a country also predict income and the 
quality of institutions in 1997. Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2006, 2009) show that the 
state of technology in a country 500, 1500, or even 3000 years ago has predictive power 
for the level of output today.  Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) find that an index 
of the presence of state-level political institutions from year 1 to 1950 has positive 
correlations, significant at the 1% level, with both 1995 income and 1960-95 income 
growth. And Galor and Moav (2007) provide empirical evidence for a link from the 
timing of the transition to agriculture to current variations in life expectancy. 
  
  Examining this sort of historical data immediately raises a problem, however: the 
further back into the past one looks, the more the economic history of a given place tends 
to diverge from the economic history of the people who currently live there.  For 
example, the territory that is now the United States was inhabited in 1500 largely by 
hunting, fishing, and horticultural communities with pre-iron technology, organized into 
relatively small, pre-state political units.
1  By contrast, a large fraction of current U.S. 
population is descended from people who in 1500 lived in settled agricultural societies 
with advanced metallurgy, organized into large states.  The example of the United States 
also makes it clear that, because of migration, the long-historical background of the 
people living in a given country can be quite heterogeneous.  This observation, combined 
with the finding that long-history of a country’s residents affects the average level of 
income, naturally raises the question of whether heterogeneity in background of a 
country’s residents is a determinant of income inequality within the country.   
 
  Previous attempts to deal with the impact of migration in modifying the influence 
of long-term historical factors have been somewhat ad hoc. Hibbs and Olsson, for 
example, acknowledge the need to account for the movement of peoples and their 
technologies, but do so only by treating four non European countries (Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the U.S.) as if they were in Europe.  Comin, Easterly, and Gong  (2006) 
similarly add dummy variables to their regression model for countries with “major” 
European migration (the four mentioned above) and “minor” European migration (mostly 
in Latin America).
2  In other cases, variables meant to measure other things may in fact 
be proxying for migration.  For example, the measure of the origin of a country’s legal 
systems examined by La Porta et al. (1998) may be proxying for the origins of countries’ 
people.  This is also true of Hall and Jones’s (1999) proportion speaking European 
languages measure. The apparent effect of institutions that were either brought along by 
European settlers or imposed by non-settling colonial powers, as found in Acemoglu, 
                                                 
1 Anthropologists subscribing to cultural evolutionary models speak of political institutions evolving from 
the band to the tribe to the chiefdom and finally the state (see, for instance, Johnson & Earle, 1987).  There 
were no pre-Columbian states north of the Rio Grande, according to such schema. 
2 Comin, Easterly, and Gong use this technique in their 2006 working paper.  In the 2009  version of the 
paper, they adjust for migration using Version 1.0 of our migration matrix.     3
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), may be proxying for population shifts themselves, 
despite their attempt (discussed below) to control for the European-descended population 
share.  
 
  In this paper we pursue the issue of migration’s role in shaping the current 
economic landscape in a much more systematic fashion than previous literature.  We 
construct a matrix detailing the year-1500 origins of the current population of almost 
every country in the world.  (Throughout the paper, we use the term “migration” to refer 
to any movement of population across current nation borders, although we are cognizant 
that these movements included transport of slaves and forced relocation as well as 
voluntary migration.)  We then use this matrix as a tool to examine how early 
development and the pattern of population movements across borders have impacted 
current income and inequality.   
 
The most thorough previous work along these lines is in the papers by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (AJR) mentioned above, where they calculate the share of the 
population that is of European descent for 1900 and 1975.   There are a number of 
conceptual and operational differences between our approach and theirs.  Our estimates 
break down ancestor populations much more finely than “European” and “non-
European.”  This distinction is important both in the Americas, where there is great 
variation in the fraction of the population descended from Amerindians vs. Africans, and 
also in other regions, where important non-native populations are not descended from 
Europeans (consider the large Chinese-descended populations in Singapore and Malaysia, 
or Indian descendants in South Africa, Malaysia, and Fiji).  Even when we use our matrix 
to construct a measure of the European population fraction, there are considerable 
differences between our data and AJR’s.  They use as their measure of the European 
population the fraction of people who are “white,” while we also include an estimate of 
the fraction of European ancestors among mestizo populations.  In Mexico, for example, 
AJR estimate the European population in 1975 to be 15%, even though (in their data) 
there is an additional 55% of the population that is mestizo.  Our estimate of the 
European share of ancestors for today’s Mexicans is 29%.   The AJR estimates are 
primarily based on data in McEvedy and Jones (1978), which sometimes apply to whole 
regions, and occasionally involve extrapolation from as far in the past as 1800. Our data 
are based on a broader selection of more recent sources, including genetic analyses, 
encyclopedias, government reports, and compilations by religious groups, which are 
summarized in Appendices A and B.   The correlation between our measure of the 
European fraction and the AJR measure is 0.89.
3 
 
                                                 
3 The largest differences occur in the Americas.  For example, for the five Central American 
countries of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, AJR use a uniform value of 20% 
European; our estimates range from 45% in Panama to 60% in Costa Rica.   The largest outlier in the other 
direction is Trinidad and Tobago, which they list as 40% European and is only 7% in our measure.  Here 
they seem to have erroneously counted all non-Africans as European, despite the presence of a large Asian 
population.   
   4
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 describes the 
construction of our migration matrix, and then uses the matrix to lay out some of the 
important facts regarding the population movements that have reshaped genetic and 
cultural landscapes in the world since 1500.  We find that a significant minority of the 
world’s countries have populations mainly descended from the people of other continents 
and that these countries themselves are quite economically heterogeneous.  In Section 2, 
we apply our migration matrix to analyze the determinants of current income.  Using 
several measures of early development, we show that adjusting the data to reflect where 
people’s ancestors came from improves the ability of measures of early social and 
technological development to predict current levels of income.  The positive effect of 
ancestry-adjusted early development on current income is robust to the inclusion of a 
variety of controls for geography, climate, and current language.  We also examine the 
effect on current income of heterogeneity in early development.  We find that, holding 
constant the average level of early development, heterogeneity in early development 
raises current income, a finding that might indicate spillovers of growth-promoting traits 
among national origin groups.    In Section 3, we turn to the issue of inequality.  We show 
that heterogeneity in the early development of a country’s ancestors predicts current 
income inequality and that this effect is robust to the inclusion of several other measures 
of the heterogeneity of the current population.  We also show that ethnic groups 
originating in regions with higher levels of early development tend to be placed higher in 
a recipient country’s income distribution.  Section 4 concludes.   
 
 
1. Large-scale population movements since 1500 
 
  We use the year 1500 as a rough starting point for the era of European 
colonization of the other continents.  It is well known that most contemporary residents 
of countries such as Australia and the United States are not descendants of their 
territory’s inhabitants circa 1500, but of people who arrived subsequently from Europe, 
Africa, and other regions.  But exactly what proportions of the ancestors of today’s 
inhabitants of each country derive from what regions and from the territories of which 
present-day countries has not been systematically studied.  Accordingly, we examined a 
wide array of secondary compilations to form the best available estimates of where the 
ancestors of the long-term residents of today’s countries were living in 1500.  Generally, 
these estimates have to work back from information presented in terms of ethnic 
groupings in modern populations. For example, sources roughly agree on the proportion 
of Mexico’s population considered to be mestizo, that is having both Spanish and 
indigenous ancestors, on the proportion having exclusively Spanish ancestors, on the 
proportion exclusively indigenous, and on the proportion descended from migrants from 
other countries.  There is similar agreement about the proportion of Haitians descended 
from African slaves, the proportion of people of (east) Indian origin in Guyana, the 
proportion of “mixed” and “Asian” people in South Africa, and so on. 
 
  A crucial and challenging piece of our methodology is the attribution, with proper 
weights, of mixed populations such as mestizos and mulattoes to their original source 
countries.  Saying, for example, that Mexican mestizos are descended from Spanish   5
immigrants and native Mexicans gives no information about the shares of these different 
groups in that ancestry.  Socially constructed descriptions of race and ethnicity may differ 
from the mathematical contributions to individuals’ ancestry in which we are interested.  
Contributions from particular groups may be suppressed, exaggerated, or simply 
forgotten.  
 
  For these reasons, whenever possible we have used genetic evidence as the basis 
for dividing the ancestry of modern mixed groups that account for large fractions of their 
country’s population.
4  The starting point for this analysis is differences in the frequency 
with which different alleles (alternative DNA sequences at a fixed position on a 
chromosome) appear in ancestor populations from different parts of the world.   
Comparing the allele frequency in a modern population to the frequency in source 
populations, one can derive an estimate of the percentage contribution of each source. 
Early studies in this literature used blood group frequencies in modern populations to 
estimate ancestry.  More recent studies use allele frequencies for multiple genes.  In 
selecting among studies, we favored those based on larger samples with well-identified 
source populations as well as those done in more recent years using modern techniques.
5 
The genetic studies we consulted were sometimes of specific groups (such as mestizos) 
and sometimes of the population as a whole, unconditional on race or ethnicity.  In the 
former case, we applied the genetic evidence to divide up ancestry in the particular mixed 
group, and multiplied by that group’s representation in the overall population.
6 
 
Examination of this genetic evidence produced a number of surprises regarding 
the ancestry of new-world populations.  For example, the usual historical narrative is that 
many native populations  in the Caribbean, such as the Arawak who occupied the island 
of Hispaniola (present day Haiti and Dominican Republic), died out during the early 
decades of colonial rule due to disease and the effects of enslavement.  However, genetic 
evidence suggests that of the ancestors of current residents of the Dominican Republic 
alive in 1500, 3.6% were local Amerindians. In the case of Costa Rica, 86.5% of 
residents describe themselves as being of Spanish origin, but genetic evidence 
(unconditional on ethnicity or race) shows Costa Rican’s ancestry (apart from a small 
Chinese minority) to be 61% Spanish, 30% Amerindian, and 9% African.  A final 
                                                 
4  By “substantial,” we mean 30% or greater.  In addition, we incorporated findings from genetic studies on 
U.S. African-Americans and on Puerto Ricans and Costa Ricans of primarily Spanish descent, for whom 
modern genetic studies indicate appreciable admixture (with Europeans and Amerindians, respectively) 
since 1500.    
5 We focus on autosomal DNA, which is not sex linked, in preference to information on either the Y 
chromosome, indicating descent along the male line, or mitochondrial DNA, which indicates descent along 
the female line.  However, evidence from sex-linked genes can provide a useful check on our historical 
understanding.  For example, among many mixed populations in the Caribbean, Native American 
characteristics are far more common in mitochondrial DNA than on Y chromosomes, indicating that native 
men were largely unable to breed, while native women produced children with European and African men. 
6 We used genetic evidence in our analyses of  Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, 
United States, and Venezuela.  We also searched for genetic data for other countries for which our 
conventional sources list large mixed ancestry populations, but were unsuccessful in finding anything in the 
cases of  El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama.  See section II.4 of the Main Appendix as well as the 
individual country entries in the regional appendices for details.    6
example: the genetic data we examined show a significant contribution of Africans (10%) 
to the ancestry of the mestizos who make up 60% of Mexico’s population. 
  
In cases where genetic evidence on the ancestry of mixed groups was not 
available, we relied on textual accounts and/or generalizations from countries with 
similar histories for which genetic data were available.  Genetic information can only 
distinguish between broad ancestry groups, such as Africans, Native Americans, and 
Europeans.  Beyond this genetic information, other sources were brought to bear to help 
in the decomposition of mixed categories.  For example, we use an archive on the slave 
trade to estimate the proportion of slaves in a given region who originated from parts of 
Africa identifiable with certain present-day countries.  We apply estimates of where the 
world’s Ashkenazi Jews and Gypsies lived in 1500 to map people with these ethnic 
identifications to specific countries of today.  Similarly, in some countries such as the 
United States and Canada, national censuses contain information on the breakdown by 
specific country of ancestry. 
 
  Using these methods, we constructed a matrix of migration since 1500.  The 
matrix has 165 rows, each for a present-day country, and 172 columns (the same 165 
countries plus seven other source countries with current populations of less than one half 
million.)  Its entries are the proportion of long-term residents’ ancestors estimated to have 
lived in each source country in 1500.  Each row sums to one.   To give an example, the 
row for Malaysia has five non-zero entries, corresponding to the five source countries for 
the current Malaysian population:  Malaysia (0.60), China (0.27), India (0.075), 
Indonesia (0.04) and the Philippines (0.025). 
7 
 
  The principal diagonal of the matrix provides a quick indication of differences in 
the degree to which countries are now populated by the ancestors of their historical 
populations.  The diagonal entries for China and Ethiopia (with shares below half a 
percent being ignored) are 1.0, while the corresponding entries for Jamaica, Haiti and 
Mauritius are 0.0 and that of Fiji is close to 0.5.  In some cases, the diagonal entry may 
give a misleading impression without further analysis; for example, the diagonal entry for 
Botswana is 0.31 because only 31% of Botswanans’ ancestors are estimated to have lived 
in present-day Botswana in 1500, but another 67% were Africans who migrated to 
Botswana from what is now neighboring South Africa in the 17
th and 18
th centuries.   
 
  Figures 1a and 1b are histograms of the proportion of countries and people, 
respectively, falling into decile bands with respect to the proportion of the current 
people’s ancestors residing in the same or an immediate neighboring country in 1500.
8  
The figures show bimodal distributions, with 9.7% of countries having 0 to 10% 
indigenous or near-indigenous ancestry and 70.3% of countries having 90 to 100% such 
                                                 
7 The entire matrix and all appendices can be downloaded at 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/ .   Appendix A to this paper briefly describes our 
sources and methods.  Appendix B provides further details, including summaries of the factors behind the 
estimate for each row. 
8 We define immediate neighbor as sharing a land boundary or being separated by less than 24 miles of 
water.  Data are from Correlates of War Project (2000).     7
ancestry.  Altogether, 80.9% of the world’s people (excluding those in the smallest 
countries, which are not covered) live in countries that are more than 90% indigenous in 
population, while 10.0% live in countries that are less than 30% indigenous, with the rest 
(dominated by Central America, the Andes, and Malaysia) falling in between.  
 
  The compositions of non-indigenous populations are also of interest.  The 
populations of Australia, New Zealand and Canada are overwhelmingly of European 
origin, while Central American and Andean countries have both large Amerindian and 
substantial European-descended populations, and Caribbean countries and Brazil have 
substantial African-descended populations.  Guyana, Fiji, Malaysia and Singapore are 
among those countries with substantial minorities descended from South Asians, while 
Malaysia and Singapore also have large Chinese-descended populations.
9  We illustrate 
differences both in the proportions of people of non-local descent and in the composition 
of those people by means of Map 1.  Country shading indicates the proportion of the 
population not descended from residents of the same or immediate neighboring countries.  
Pie charts, drawn for thirteen macro-regions, show the average proportions descended 
from European migrants, from migrants (or slaves) from Africa, and from migrants from 
other regions, as well as the proportion descended from people of the same region.
10  In 
terms of territory, about half the world’s land mass (excluding Greenland and Antarctica), 
comprising almost all of Africa, Europe and Asia, is in countries with almost entirely 
indigenous populations (shown in black), while about a third has less than 20% 
indigenous inhabitants, and the remainder, dominated by Central America, the Andes and 
Malaysia, falls somewhere in between.  The heterogeneity of regions in the Americas and 
Australia/New Zealand is highlighted by the pie charts, showing strong European 
dominance in Australia/New Zealand, the U.S., Canada, and eastern South America, 
stronger indigenous presence in the Andes, and strong African representation in the 
Caribbean.  We consider the effects of this heterogeneity in Section 3. 
 
  While we are mostly interested in using the migration matrix to better understand 
the determinants of long-run economic performance in countries as presently populated, 
the versatility of the data can be illustrated by using it to calculate the number of 
descendants of populations that lived five centuries ago and to see how they’ve fared.  
Given data on country populations in 2000, the matrix will tell the total number of people 
                                                 
9 The populations of Hong Kong and Taiwan are also overwhelmingly descended from Chinese who came 
to their territories after 1500, giving those entities 97.1% and 98% ancestry from what is now China, 
according to the matrix. 
10 Regions were defined with the aim of keeping their number small enough for purposes of display and 
grouping countries with similar population profiles.  The Caribbean includes Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Europe is inclusive of the Russian Republic.  North 
Africa, West and Central Asia includes all African and Asian countries bordering the Mediterranean, 
including Turkey, the traditional Middle East, Afghanistan, and former Soviet republics in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia.  South Asia includes Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan.  East 
Asia includes Mongolia, China, Hong Kong, North and South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.  Southeast Asia 
includes the remainder of Asia plus New Guinea and Fiji.  Note that for calculation of the pie chart shares, 
ancestors are assumed to be from “the same region” if they are from countries in the regions as thus 
indicated.  This assumption means that Europeans are left out of the “European migrant” category of the 
pie charts if they live in Europe, even if they’ve migrated within the continent, and likewise for sub-
Saharan Africans in SSA.   8
today who are descended from each 1500 source country, and where on the globe they 
are to be found.  For instance, using 2000 population figures from Penn World Tables 
6.2, we find that there were 32.9 million descendants of 1500’s Irish alive at the turn of 
the millennium, of whom 11.3% lived in Ireland itself, 77.2% in the U.S., 5.0% in 
Australia, and 4.1% in Canada.   
 
Combining the information in the matrix with population data for the years 1500 
and 2000 yields a number of interesting insights.  Because population data for 1500 are 
very noisy, particularly at the country level, we confine our analysis to looking at 11 
large regions.
11  The first two columns of Table 1 list the estimated population of each 
region in 1500 and 2000.  The third column shows the increase in total population over 
the 500 year period.  The primary determinant of this increase in density is the level of 
economic development in 1500.  Europe, East Asia, and South Asia, which were highly 
developed, had the smallest increases in density.  The U.S. and Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, and the Caribbean, which were relatively lightly populated, lacked urban 
centers, and were still home to many pre-agricultural societies in 1500, had the largest 
increases.
12 The next four columns of the table use the matrix to track the relationship 
between ancestor and descendant populations.   In column 4, we calculate the number of 
descendants per capita for each region in 1500, which can be thought of as a kind of 
“genetic success” quotient.   The lowest values of this measure are in the US and Canada 
and Australia and New Zealand, where native populations were largely displaced by 
European colonizers.  Among the regions that were relatively developed in 1500, Europe, 
not surprisingly, has the largest number of descendants per capita.  The two regions with 
the highest genetic success are sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, which were both 
relatively poor (and thus less densely populated) in 1500 but in which the native 
population was hardly at all displaced by migrants. Column 5 calculates the fraction of 
the current regional population that is descended from the region’s own 1500 ancestors.  
This ranges from 0.03 for the US and Canada and Australia and New Zealand to almost 
one for South Asia and East Asia.    Column 6 shows the fraction of descendants of the 
1500 population that still live in the same region.   This is lowest in the Caribbean (38%), 
Europe (54%), Mexico and Central America (85%) and sub-Saharan Africa (86%).  The 
last column of the table calculates the total number of people descended from a region 
who live outside it.  There were a total of 777 million such people in 2000, amounting to 
12.8% of world population.  Here Europe is by far the dominant contributor, with 578 
million descendents living outside the region, followed by sub-Saharan Africa with 103 
million and East Asia with 37 million.
13 
  
                                                 
11 Data are from McEvedy and Jones (1978).  The regions are the same as those in Map 1, except that the 
three parts of South America are collapsed into a single region.   
12 Estimates of pre-Columbian population in the Americas are highly controversial due to considerable 
uncertainty about the death rates in epidemics that followed European contact.  Since McEvedy and Jones’s 
estimates fall toward the low end of some more recent appraisals, the resulting estimates of the increase in 
population density since 1500 could be overstated. 
13 It is worth reminding the reader that we calculate “descendents” by adding up fractions of individuals’ 
ancestry.  Thus two individuals who each have half their ancestry from Europe add up to one descendent in 
our usage. 
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2.  Reassessing the Effects of Early Economic Development 
 
2.1  Measures of Early Development 
 
  In the introduction, we noted that studies including Hibbs and Olsson (2004, 
2005), Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2006) and Chanda and Putterman (2006) find strong 
correlations between measures of early agricultural, technological, or political 
development and current levels of economic development, but that these studies make 
relatively ad hoc adjustments, if any, to account for the large population movements on 
which this paper focuses.  The new migration matrix puts us in a position to remedy these 
shortcomings and thereby put the theory that very early development persists in its effects 
on economic outcomes to a more stringent test. 
 
  We use two measures of early development.  The first is an index of state history 
called statehist. The index takes into account whether what is now a country had present 
a supra-tribal government, the geographic scope of that government, and whether that 
government was indigenous or by an outside power.  The version used by us, as in 
Chanda and Putterman (2006, 2007), considers state history for the fifteen centuries to 
1500, and discounts the past, reducing the weight on each half century before 1451-1500 
by an additional 5%.  Let sit be the state history variable in country i for the 50 year 
period t. sit ranges between 0 and 50 by definition, being 0 if there was no supra-tribal 
state, 50 if there was a home-based supra-tribal state covering most of the present-day 
country’s territory, 25 if there was supra-tribal rule over that territory by a foreign power, 
and taking values ranging from 15 (7.5) to 37.5 (18.75) for home- (foreign-) based  states 
covering between 10 and 50% of the present-day territory or when several small states 
co-exist on that territory.  statehist is computed by taking the discounted sum of the state 
history variables over the thirty half centuries and normalizing it to be between 0 and 1 
(by dividing it by the maximum achievable, i.e. the statehist value of a country that had 













50 ) 05 . 1 (







For illustration, Ethiopia has the maximum value of 1, China’s statehist value is 0.906 
(due to periods of political disunity), Egypt’s value is 0.760, Spain’s 0.562, Mexico’s 
0.533, Senegal’s 0.398, and Canada, the U.S., Australia and New Guinea have statehist 
values of 0.
14 
                                                 
14  Bockstette et al. (2002) and Chanda and Putterman (2006) also use versions of statehist that include data 
for the years between 1501 and 1950.  The variable that we call statehist in this paper is the same as what 
Chanda and Putterman (2006, 2007) call statehist1500.  Details on the construction of the state history  
index, and the data itself, can be found in Putterman (2004).  Note that by beginning with 1 C.E., statehist 
ignores some difference in the onset of state-level society, i.e. those between the most ancient states like 
Mesopotamia and Egypt (third millennium, B.C.E.), and more recent ones like Rome and pre-Colombian 
Mesoamerica (first millennium, B.C.E.).   10
 
  Our second measure of early development, agyears, is the number of millennia 
since a country transitioned from hunting and gathering to agriculture.  Unlike a similar 
measure used by Hibbs and Olsson, which had values for eight macro regions, these data 
are based on individual country information augmented by extrapolation to fill gaps 
within regions.  The data were assembled by Putterman with Trainor (2006) by 
consulting region- and country-specific as well as wider-ranging studies on the transition 
to agriculture, such as MacNeish (1991) and Smith (1995).  The variable agyears is 
simply the number of years prior to 2000, in thousands, since a significant number of 
people in an area within the country’s present borders are believed to have met most of 
their food needs from cultivated foods.  The highest value, 10.5, occurs for four Fertile 
Crescent countries (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) followed closely by Iraq and 
Turkey (10), Iran (9.5), China (9) and India (8.5).  Near the middle of the pack are 
countries like Belarus (4.5), Ecuador (4), Ivory Coast (3.5) and Congo (3).   At the 
bottom are countries like Haiti and Jamaica (1) which received crop-growing immigrants 
from the American mainland only a few hundred years before Columbus, New Zealand 
(0.8), which obtained agriculture late in the Austronesian expansion, and Cape Verde 
(0.5), Australia (0.4) and others in which agriculture arrived for the first time with 
European colonists.
15  It is worth noting that while statehist measures a stock of 
experience with state-level organization that takes into account, for example, set-backs 
like the disappearance, break-up, or annexation of an existing state by a neighboring 
empire, agyears simply measures the time elapsed since agriculture’s founding in the 
country, with no attempt to gauge temporal changes in the kind, intensity, or prevalence 
of farming within the country’s territory.
16  
   
We examine each of these variables both in its original form and adjusted to 
account for migration.  Supposing the “early developmental advantages” proxied by 
statehist and agyears to be something that migrants bring with them to their new country, 
the adjusted variables measure the average level of such advantages in a present-day 
country as the weighted average of statehist or agyears in the countries of ancestry, with 
weights equal to population shares.  For instance, ancestry-adjusted statehist for 
Botswana is simply 0.312 times the statehist value for Botswana plus 0.673 times 
statehist for South Africa (referring to the people in South Africa in 1500, not those there 
presently) plus weights of 0.005 each times the statehist values of France, Germany and 
the Netherlands (the ancestral homes of Botswana’s small Afrikaner population).  
Algebraically, the “matrix adjusted” form of any variable is Xv, where X is the migration 
matrix and v is the variable in its unadjusted form.   
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the effect of this adjustment on the variables statehist and 
agyears, respectively.  The horizontal axis shows the variable in its unadjusted form and 
the vertical axis shows the variable in its adjusted form. In the case of statehist the data 
form a sort of check mark: there are a large number of countries along the 45 degree line, 
where adjusted and unadjusted statehist are the same because there has been little or no in 
                                                 
15 For further description, see Putterman with Trainor (2006).   
16 The difference is primarily due to data availability.  Accounts of the histories of kingdoms, dynasties, and 
empires are considerably easier to come by than are detailed agricultural histories.   11
migration.   These range from China and Ethiopia, with very high levels of statehist, 
down to eleven countries at or very near the origin, where there was no history of 
organized states before 1500 and there has been insignificant migration of people from 
countries that did have organized states in 1500.  There are also a large number of 
countries along the vertical axis, where a population that had zero statehist has been 
replaced by migrants who have positive values.  There is a great deal of dispersion in the 
adjusted values of statehist in this group, however, reflecting different mixes of 
immigrants (primarily European vs. African) and different degrees to which the native 
population was displaced.  Only a handful of countries do not fall into one of these two 
categories.   
 
In the case of agyears, as show in Figure 3, there are still a lot of countries along 
the 45 degree line where there has been no in-migration.  However, because almost all 
countries had a history of agriculture prior to the spread of European colonialization after 
1500, there is not the strong vertical element that is seen in Figure 2.  In this sense, 




2.2  The Effect of Early Development on Current National Income 
 
Table 2 shows the results of regressing the log of year 2000 per capita income on 
our early development measures.  Each regression includes the unadjusted form of one 
early development measure, the adjusted form, or both.  Not surprisingly, given previous 
work, the tests suggest significant predictive power for the unadjusted variables.  
However, for both measures of early development, adjusting for migration produces a 
very large increase in explanatory power.  In the case of statehist, the R
2 goes from .06 to 
.22, while in the case of agyears it goes from .08 to .24.  The coefficients on the measures 
of early development are also much larger using the adjusted than the unadjusted values.  
In the third and sixth columns of the table we run “horse race” regressions including both 
the adjusted and unadjusted measures of early development.  We find that the coefficients 
on the adjusted measures retain their significance and become larger while the 
coefficients on the unadjusted measures become negative and significant.   
 
  Before proceeding further we test the robustness of our finding to different 
indicators of population flows, the addition of controls for geography, and alternative 
measures of early development.   In Table 3, we start by constructing measures of 
statehist and agyears that are adjusted in the spirit of Hibbs and Olsson (2004, 2005) by 
simply assigning to four “neo European” countries  (the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia) the statehist and agyears values of the United Kingdom.
18  As the 
table shows, these adjusted versions perform better than the unadjusted ones, but not 
nearly as well as the versions we construct using the migration matrix.  When we run 
                                                 
17 Agriculture began in places like the Fertile Crescent, China and Mesoamerica millennia before states 
arose there, and there are numerous present-day countries, e.g. in the Americas and Africa, on the territories 
of which agriculture had arisen but states had not as of 1500.  
18 Hibbs and Olsson actually assign these countries the values for the region treated as inheriting the 
Mesopotamian agrarian tradition, which includes all of North Africa, the Middle East and Europe.      12
“horserace” regressions including statehist and agyears adjusted using both our matrix 
and the “neo Europes” method (columns 2 and 4), the coefficients on the matrix-adjusted 
measures rise in size and significance, while the coefficient on the “neo Europes”  
adjusted measures become negative and significant.  
 
We then construct a series of other measures from our matrix.  The first is the 
fraction of the population made up of “natives” (that is, people whose ancestors lived 
there in 1500).  We include this alongside our measures of adjusted statehist and agyears 
in order to check that we are not just picking up the fact that there is a correlation 
between the share of a population’s ancestors who lived elsewhere and the types of 
countries they lived in.  In a similar spirit we construct a measure of the fraction of the 
descendants of each country’s people in 1500 who live in that country today, which we 
call “retained population.”  For example, only 40.2% of those descended from the 1500 
population of what’s now the United Kingdom live there today, whereas 97.4% of Indian 
descendants still live in India.
19 Neither of these measures eliminates the statistical 
significance of our adjusted history measures.  Native is negative and significant, 
showing that immigrant-populated countries are better off on average.  Retained 
population enters our regression with a negative sign and is marginally significant, 
suggesting either that the venting of surplus population may have aided growth or that 
characteristics that led to countries being able to implant their population abroad also led 
them to be richer today.   
 
Our third set of robustness checks examines whether our adjusted measures of 
statehist and agyears are simply proxying for a large European population or for 
speaking a European language.  In columns 7-9 we include the fraction of the population 
descended from 1500 inhabitants of European countries, a variable that we create using 
the matrix.    Not surprisingly, given that most of the world’s highest income countries 
are either in Europe or mainly populated by persons of European descent, the European 
descent variable comes in very significantly.  By itself, it explains 46 percent of the 
variance in the log of GDP per capita.  However, even controlling for this variable, our 
adjusted measures of state history and agriculture are quite significant.  It is also worth 
pointing out that in controlling for European descent rather than, say, Chinese or Indian 
descent, we are implicitly taking advantage of ex-post knowledge about which of the 
regions that were well developed in 1500 would have the wealthiest descendents today.  
In columns 10-12, we include the fraction of the population speaking one of five 
European languages (English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian), which is used by 
Hall and Jones (1999) as an instrument for “social infrastructure.” This variable explains 
only 20 percent of the variation in log of income per capita by itself, and has a negligible 
effect on the magnitude and significance of our measures of early development.    
 
                                                 
19 Note that the migration matrix is a rather blunt tool to use for this sort of exercise, because (even with the 
added population data) it doesn’t tell us how many people left the country in question but only how many 
descendants they have today and where the descendants live.  A small number of émigrés may have 
produced a large number of descendants (for example, the French Canadians) or a large number of émigrés 
may have produced relatively few (for example, African slaves shipped to the Caribbean).     13
In Table 4, we consider the effect of a series of measures of geography on the 
statistical significance of our adjusted statehist and agyears variables, in order to make 
sure that our measures of early development are not somehow proxying for physical 
characteristics of the countries to which people moved.  Specifically, we control for a 
country’s absolute latitude, a dummy for being landlocked, a dummy for being in Eurasia 
(defined as Europe, Asia, and North Africa), and a measure of the suitability of a country 
for agriculture.   This last variable, constructed by Hibbs and Olsson (2004), takes 
discrete values between 0 (tropical dry) and 3 (Mediterranean).   Taken one at a time, 
each of these controls has a significant effect on log income, with the predictable sign.  
However, none of them individually, or even all four taken together, eliminates the 
statistical significance of matrix-adjusted statehist or agyears.   
 
Our final check for robustness is to see whether our matrix-adjustment procedure 
works similarly well on measures of early development other than statehist and agyears. 
We consider four other measures of early development.  The first two come from Hibbs 
and Olsson (2005) and are meant to capture the conditions that favored the early 
transition of a region to agriculture, as proposed by Diamond (1997). Geo Conditions is 
the first principal component of climate (as measured above), latitude, the size of the 
landmass on which a country is located, and a measure of a landmass’s East-West 
orientation.   Bio Conditions is the first principal component of the number of heavy-
seeded wild grasses and the number of large domesticable animals known to have existed 
in a macro region in prehistory.  The other two measures come from Comin, Easterly, and 
Gong (2009), and measure the degree of technological sophistication in the years 1 and 
1500 CE in the regions that correspond to modern countries.  
  
In Table 5 we show univariate regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
log of GDP per capita in 2000 and each measure of early development appears in either 
its original form or adjusted using the migration matrix.  The most notable finding of the 
table is that, as expected, adjusting for migration substantially improves the predictive 
power of any of the alternative measures of early development that we consider.  In the 
cases of the two Hibb-Olsson measures as well as the technology index for 1 CE, the R-
squared of the regression rises by roughly 15 percentage points.  In the case of the 
technology index for 1500, the R-squared rises by 34 percentage points.
20 
 
A second finding of Table 5 is that the migration-adjusted versions of three of the 
variables we look at – bio conditions, geo conditions, and the technology index for 1500 
– do a better job of predicting income today than the matrix adjusted version of statehist 
and agyears.   In the case of technology in 1500, this is not particularly surprising.  
Statehist and agyears are meant to measure political and economic development in the 
millennia before the great shuffling of population that is captured in the migration matrix 
(for example, the average value of agyears is 4.7 millennia).  The technology measure, by 
contrast, measures development immediately prior to that shuffling, and so focuses on 
information that is more likely to be predictive of current outcomes.  By contrast, the fact 
that the matrix-adjusted versions of geo conditions and bio conditions outperform the 
similarly adjusted versions of agyears in predicting income today is more mysterious.  
                                                 
20 Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2009) perform a similar exercise using version 1.0 of our matrix.    14
The Hibbs and Olsson variables are designed to be a measure of the suitability of local 
conditions to the emergence of agriculture.  Hibbs and Olsson think that these variables 
should predict the timing of the Neolithic revolution, and through that channel predict 
income today.  One would thus expect that a measure of when agriculture actually did 
emerge, agyears, would have superior predictive power.
21   
 
Overall, the results in Tables 2-5 show that adjusting for migration improves the 
predictive power of measures of early development, and that once migration is taken into 
account, the ability of these historical measures to predict income today is surprisingly 
high.  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that especially Europeans and to 
some extent East and South Asians carried something with them – human capital, culture, 
institutions, or something else – that raised the level of income in the Americas, 
Australia, Malaysia, and elsewhere.  The findings are also consistent with the possibility 
that a corresponding disadvantage of Africans has played out in new homes such as 
Jamaica and Haiti, although not ruling out the possibility that their arrival in these places 
as slaves rather than as migrants may also have played a role.   
 
By contrast, the findings of Tables 2-5 cast doubt on the idea that the same 
favorable climactic conditions that led some regions to develop early are also responsible 
for those regions enjoying an economic advantage today  This can be seen in both the 
superiority of migration-adjusted measures of early development to the unadjusted 
versions of these measures, and also in the robustness of migration adjusted early 
development measures to inclusion of measures of countries’ geographic characteristics.   
 
As implied above, our preferred interpretation of these results is that they reflect a 
causal link from migration of people from countries with higher levels of early 
development to subsequent economic growth.  It is nonetheless worth considering 
whether the results might instead simply reflect, or at least be biased by, the endogeneity 
of migration.  Suppose that people from countries with earlier development ended up 
migrating to places that were better in some respect (climate, institution, etc.), and that it 
                                                 
21 The superior predictive power of bio conditions results from the classification of the world into only 
eight “macro regions” and, most importantly, the grouping of Europe and the Fertile Crescent into a single 
region.  This region, which stretches all the way from Sweden to Pakistan, has the highest values of bio 
conditions. By contrast, our variable agyears has a value of 5.5 millennia for the United Kingdom and 10 
millennia on average for the Fertile Crescent countries.  By assigning to Europe, the region that was the 
source of most rich country populations today, the high value of the Fertile Crescent, the Hibbs-Olsson 
measure mechanically makes bio conditions an excellent predictor of income today, when adjusted by the 
migration matrix.  Another way to see this problem is to note that despite the fact that China had lower 
values for bio conditions than does a Europe treated as part of a ‘greater Fertile Crescent’ macro region 
(0.153 vs. 1.46, on a scale with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one), China developed agriculture 
some three thousand years earlier than Europe.  Thus the prediction of the Hibbs-Olsson story – that 
biogeographic conditions should predict the timing of the Neolithic revolution, which in turn predicts 
income today – is falsified by more location-specific Neolithic revolution timing.  Similarly, the mapping 
from geo conditions to the development of agriculture does not work nearly as well as the mapping from 
geo conditions (in its matrix adjusted form) to current income.  For example, within Europe, the region 
with the highest values of geo conditions, the correlation between geo conditions and agyears is slightly 
negative, driven by the strongly negative correlation between latitude and agyears.   
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was this aspect of quality rather than the presence of migrants from areas of early 
development that ended up making these places wealthy.  Some reassurance that this is 
not all that is going on is provided by Tables 3 and 4.  Controlling for aspects of the 
quality of physical environment in destination countries, such as climate and latitude, 
does not make the effect of early development go away.  Similarly, if relative emptiness 
of some countries both attracted a lot of migrants from early developing areas and also 
made those countries wealthy, then this effect would be picked up by the variables native 
in Table 4.  Further, Engerman and Sokolof (2002) show that European migrants , when 
they were able to choose where in the New World to migrate, were not attracted to those 
regions which in the long run would achieve the highest levels of economic success.   In 
future work we hope to further address the issue of causality by looking more closely at 
the timing of migration and changes in institutions and income.  For now, however, we 
continue to examine the link between early development of a population and the 
subsequent income of their descendants, wherever they may live, with the strong 
suspicion that this is causal.     
 
Under the assumption that early development of a country’s population is causally 
linked to current income, one would want to know the specific channel through which 
this effect flows.  For the most part, we consider this an issue for future research.  
However, we cannot resist taking an initial look at one possibility. Recent literature has 
stressed the role of institutions as a fundamental determinant of national income.   One 
could well imagine that whatever it was that immigrants with long histories of state 
development took with them that led to higher income manifests itself in better 
institutions.  In Table 6, we look at the relationship between our statehist measure and 
three indicators of institutional quality:  executive constraints, expropriation risk, and 
government effectiveness (all from Glaeser et al., 2004). In each case, the dependent 
variable is normalized to have a standard deviation of one.  Not surprisingly, using the 
matrix to adjust statehist to reflect the experience of a country’s population greatly 
improves the ability of this variable to predict the quality of institutions.   Once matrix 
adjusted, it is also statistically significant in all three cases. Similarly, the estimated 
coefficient on statehist rises in each case moving from the unadjusted to the adjusted 
measure.  The coefficient in column (6), for example, implies that moving from statehist 
of zero (for example, Rwanda) to statehist of one (Ethiopia), raises government 
effectiveness by 1.32 standard deviations – roughly the difference between Bhutan or 
Bahrain, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other.   Of course this exercise 
does not say anything about the path of causality from early development to high income 
and good institutions.  Early development could cause good institutions, which cause 
high income; or early development could cause high income through some other channel, 
and only affect institutions through income. 
 
2.3    Source Region and Current Region Regressions 
 
Although our interest in most of this paper is in how the migration matrix can be 
used to map data on place-specific early development into a measure of early 
development appropriate to a country’s current population, the matrix can also be used to 
infer characteristics of the source countries based only on current data.  More   16
specifically, if we assume that emigrants from a particular region share some 
characteristics that affect the income of countries to which they have migrated, then we 
can back out these characteristics by looking at data on current outcomes and migration 
patterns. 
 
To pursue this idea we regress log GDP per capita in 2000 on the fraction of the 
current population that comes from each of the 11 regions defined previously for the 
exercises of Table 1.  We call the coefficients from this regression, shown in column (1) 
of Table 7, “source region coefficients.”  Loosely speaking, they measure how having a 
country’s population composed of people from a particular region can be expected to 
affect GDP per capita.  For example, the source region coefficient for Europe is 2.35, 
while that for sub-Saharan Africa is zero, since this is the omitted category.  Thus these 
coefficients say that moving 10% of a country’s population from European to African 
origin would be expected to lower ln(GDP) by .235 points.
22 
 
The second column of Table 3 shows a more conventional regression of the log of 
GDP per capita in the year 2000 on dummies for the region in which the country is 
located (as in the first column, sub-Saharan Africa is the omitted region).  We call these 
“current region coefficients.”  The R
2 of the regression with current region dummies is 
about .05 lower than the R
2 of the regression with source region shares.  It is also 
interesting to compare the coefficients on the source and current regions.  There is a 
strong tendency for regions that are rich to also have large values for their source region 
coefficients.  For example, among the six source regions that account for 97% of the 
world’s population (in size order: East Asia, South Asia, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and North Africa/West and Central Asia) the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are very similar, with the single exception of South Asia.  This similarity of 
coefficients in the two regressions is not much of a surprise, given the fact, discussed 
above, that most countries are populated primarily by people whose ancestors lived in 
that same country 500 years ago.  In column (3) of Table 3, we regress log income in 
2000 on both the source region and current region measures.  The R
2 is somewhat higher 
than in the first two columns, indicating that source regions are not simply proxying for 
current regions, or vice versa. F-tests easily reject the null hypotheses that either the 
coefficients on source region or on current region are zero.  Interestingly,  the source 
region coefficients on Europe and East Asia remain positive, while the current region 
coefficients become negative, suggesting that having population from these regions, 
rather than being located in them, is what tends to make countries rich.   
 
 
2.4   Population Heterogeneity and Income Levels 
  
                                                 
22 There are three surprisingly high coefficients in this column: US and Canada, the Caribbean, and 
Australia and New Zealand.  In all three cases the explanation is that the source populations in question 
contributed a small share of the population to only a few current countries.  For example, descendants of 
people living in the US and Canada as of 1500 contribute only 3.1% and 3.3% of the populations of those 
two countries, and are found nowhere else in the world.  Thus, because the US and Canada are wealthy, this 
source population gets assigned a high coefficient in the regression.  For this reason, we focus our attention 
on source region coefficients for populations that account for larger population shares in more countries.      17
The exercises in Section 2.2 show that a higher average level of early 
development in a country is robustly correlated with higher current income.  The most 
likely explanation for this finding is that people whose ancestors were living in countries 
that developed earlier (in the sense of implementing agriculture or creating organized 
states) brought with them some advantage—such as human capital, knowledge, culture, 
or institutions—which raises the level of income in their country up until today.  
Depending on what exact advantage is conferred by earlier development, there might also 
be implications for how the variance of early development among a country’s 
contributing populations would affect output.  For example, if early development 
conferred some cultural attribute that was good for growth, then in a population 
containing some people with a long history of development and some with a short 
history, this growth-promoting cultural trait might simply be transferred from the long 
history group to the short history group.  Similarly, growth-promoting institutions 
brought along by people with a long history of development could be extended to benefit 
people with short histories of development.  An obvious model for such transfer is 
language: in many parts of the world, descendents of people with short histories of 
development speak languages that come from Europe, which has a long history of 
development.  If growth-promoting characteristics also transfer in this fashion, then a 
country with half its population coming from areas with high statehist and half from areas 
with low statehist might be richer than a country with the same average statehist but no 
heterogeneity.   
 
  The above logic would tend to predict that, holding average history of early 
development constant, a higher variance of early development would raise a country’s 
level of income.  However, there are channels that work in the opposite direction.  As 
will be shown below, higher variance of early development predicts higher inequality.  
Inequality is often found to negatively impact growth (see, for example, Easterly 2007), 
and one could easily imagine that the inequality generated by heterogeneity in early 
development history would lead to the inefficient struggles over income redistribution or 
the creation of growth-impeding institutions.  This is certainly the flavor of the story told 
by Sokoloff  and Engermann (2000).   Similarly, the ethnic diversity that comes along 
with a population that is heterogeneous in its early development history could hinder the 
creation of growth-promoting institutions.    
 
  To assess the effect of heterogeneity in early development, we create measures of 
the weighted within-country standard deviations of statehist, agyears, and source region 
coefficients, where the weights are the fractions of that source country’s descendants in 
current population.  The mean within-country standard deviation of statehist is .097, and 
the standard deviation across countries is .089.   For agyears the mean standard deviation 
is .764, and the standard deviation across countries is .718.  For the source region 
coefficients, the values are .347 and .686, respectively.  In all cases, the distribution of 
the heterogeneity measures is skewed to the right, with a significant number of countries 
(those which experienced no immigration) having values of zero.   
 
  In Table 8 we present regressions of the log of current income per capita on the 
standard deviation of each of our three measures of early development (statehist, agyears,   18
and source region coefficients), with and without controls for the mean of each of the 
variables.  Once the mean level of statehist is controlled for, the standard deviation of 
statehist has a positive and significant effect on current income.  The same is true for 
agyears.  Interestingly, the coefficient on the standard deviation of the source region 
coefficient is not significant at all once the mean of the source region coefficients is 
included.   Including these measures of standard deviation has little effect on the size or 
significance of the coefficients on the means of statehist or agyears, as seen in Table 2.
23 
  
   The positive coefficients on the standard deviations of statehist and agyears 
imply, as discussed above, that a heterogeneous population will be better off than a 
homogeneous population with the same average level of early development.  For 
example, using the coefficients in Column 2 of Table 8, a country with a population 
composed of 50% people with a statehist of 0.4 and 50% with a statehist of 0.6 will be 
20% richer than a homogenous country with statehist of 0.5.  A country with 50% of the 
population having statehist of 1.0 and 50% with statehist of zero would be twice as rich 
as a homogenous country with the same average statehist.  (This latter example is quite 
outside the range of the data, however.  The highest values of the standard deviation of 
statehist in our data set are Fiji (0.346), Cape Verde (0.301) and Guyana (0.293).  In the 
example, the standard deviation is 0.5). 
 
  The coefficients also have the unpalatable property that a country’s predicted 
income can sometimes be raised by replacing high statehist people with low statehist 
people, since the decline in the average level of statehist will be more than balanced by 
the increase in the standard deviation.  For example, the coefficients just discussed imply 
that combining populations with statehist of 1 and 0, the optimal mix is 86% statehist=1 
and 14% statehist=0.  A country with such a mix would be 41% richer than a country 
with 100% of the population having a statehist of 1.
24   
 
We think that this somewhat counterintuitive finding may result from a particular 
set of historical contingencies that make simple policy inferences problematic.  First, 
                                                 
23 We also considered the possibility that the effect of heterogeneity in early development on current 
income is non-linear.  Ashraf and Galor (2008) argue that this is the case for genetic diversity: people with 
different genetic backgrounds are complements in production of knowledge, but genetic diversity also 
reduces social cohesion and hinders the transmission of human capital within and across generations.  As a 
result, there should be a hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and income.  Ashraf and Galor 
find evidence for this in cross country data.  Proxying for genetic diversity with migratory distance from 
East Africa, they find that the optimal level of genetic diversity occurs in East Asia.  About three quarters 
of the countries in the world have genetic diversity that is higher than optimal.  We tested for a similar 
effect by including the square of the standard deviation of the relevant early development in columns (2), 
(4), and (6) of Table 8.  In the cases of statehist and agyears, this new term entered insignificantly.  In the 
case of the source region coefficients, the coefficient on the square of the standard deviation was negative 
and significant, implying a hump-shaped relationship.  However, the peak of the hump was when the 
standard deviation of the source region coefficients was equal to 2.95.  Only two countries, the US and 
Canada, had values that exceeded this level.   
 
24 The specification that we use implies that this property must hold as long as the coefficients on both the 
mean and standard deviation are positive.  However, when we use variance on the right hand side, in which 
case the property does not automatically hold, it is nonetheless implied by the estimates.
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during the long era of European expansion spanning the 15
th to early 20
th centuries, 
European-settled countries like the United States, Chile, Mexico and Brazil having 
substantial African and/or Amerindian minorities attained considerably higher incomes 
than many homogenously populated Asian countries with relatively long state histories, 
including Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and China.  Second, the latter 
group of countries experienced little growth, or negative growth, during those same 
centuries.  Chanda and Putterman (2007) argue that the underperformance of the 
populous Asian countries during the 1500 – 1960 period is an exception to the rule 
(which they find to have held up to 1500 and again since 1960) that earlier development 
of agriculture and states has been associated with faster economic development during 
most of world history.  While our regression result reflects the fact that population 
heterogeneity has not detracted from economic development in the first group of 
countries, it seems best not to infer from it that “catch up” by homogeneous Old World 
countries would be speeded up by infusions of low statehist populations into existing 
high statehist countries. 
 
 
3.  Population Heterogeneity and Income Inequality 
 
The finding that current income is influenced by the early development of a 
country’s people, rather than of the place itself, provides evidence against some theories 
of why early development is important, but leaves many others viable.  Early 
development may matter for income today because of the persistence of institutions 
(among people, rather than places), because of cultural factors that migrants brought with 
them, because of long-term persistence in human capital, or because of genetic factors 
that are related to the amount of time since a population group began its transition to 
agriculture.   
 
  Many of the theories that explain the importance of early development in 
determining the level of income at the national level would also support the implication 
that heterogeneity in the early development of a country’s population should raise the 
level of income inequality.  For example, if experience living in settled agricultural 
societies conveys to individuals some cultural characteristics that are economically 
advantageous in the context of an industrial society, and if these characteristics have a 
high degree of persistence over generations, then a society in which individuals come 
from heterogeneous backgrounds in terms their families’ economic history should ceteris 
paribus be more unequal.   
 
  We pursue three different approaches to examining the determinants of within-
country income inequality.  We begin by showing that heterogeneity in the historical 
level of development of countries’ residents predicts the level of income inequality in a 
cross-country regression.  Second, we construct measures of population heterogeneity 
based both on the current ethnic and linguistic groupings and on the ethnic and linguistic 
differences among the sources of a country’s current population.  We show that allowing 
for these other measures of heterogeneity does not reduce the importance of 
heterogeneity in historical development as a predictor of current inequality.  Finally, we   20
pursue an implication of these findings by asking whether, within a country, people 
originating from countries that had characteristics predictive of low national income are 
in fact found to be lower in the income distribution.    
   
 
3.1 Historical Determinants of Current Inequality 
 
  In this exercise our dependent variable is the gini coefficient 2000-2004 or in the 
most recent decade using data from the UN World Income Inequality Database as 
supplemented by Barro (2008).  Our key right hand side variables are the weighted 
within-country standard deviations of statehist, agyears, and source region coefficients, 
as constructed in Section 2.4.  We experiment with including as additional controls the 
levels of these matrix-adjusted early development measures.   The results are show in 
Table 9. 
  
  Our finding is that heterogeneity in the early development experience of the 
ancestors of a country’s population is significantly related to current inequality.  To give 
a feel for the size of the coefficients, we look at the case of agyears.  The standard 
deviation of agyears in Brazil is 1.976 millennia.  By contrast, in countries which have 
essentially no in-migration, such as Japan, the standard deviation is zero.  Applying the 
regression coefficient of .0571 from the fourth column of Table 9, this would say that 
variation in early development in Brazil would be expected to raise the gini there by .11, 
which is certainly an economically significant amount.  Since Brazil’s gini was .57 and 
Japan’s .25, the exercise suggests that about one third of the difference in inequality 
between the two countries may be attributable to the difference in the heterogeneity of 
their populations’ early development experiences.   
 
  The results in columns (5) and (6) for source region coefficients are similar in 
flavor but somewhat smaller in magnitude.  Taking the case of Brazil again, the variance 
of the source region coefficient in that country is 0.888, reflecting a composition of 
74.4% people from Europe (SRC of 2.53), 9.1% from South America (SRC of .498) and 
15.7% from Africa (SRC of 0).   The coefficient in the sixth column of Table 9 implies 
that the difference in standard deviation of the source region coefficients between Brazil, 
on the one hand, and a country like Japan where the standard deviation of source region 
coefficients is zero, on the other, would be expected to raise the gini coefficient by .043 .   
 
3.2   Other Measures of Heterogeneity  
 
  Our main finding in the last section was that heterogeneity of a country’s 
population’s ancestors with respect to measures of early development contributes to 
current income inequality.  We now pursue the question of whether heterogeneity in the 
background of migrants more generally may affect the level of income inequality in a 
country.  If this were the case, then in our previous findings heterogeneity of early 
development might simply be proxying for more general heterogeneity.  To address this 
issue, we examine two standard measures of heterogeneity as well as two new measures   21
created using the matrix, and we compare the predictive power of these measures to each 
other and to the measures that incorporate early development.   
 
  The theory implicit in this exercise is that a country made up of people who are 
similar in terms of culture, language, religion, skin color, or similar attributes will ceteris 
paribus have lower inequality.  This could come about through a number of different 
channels.  Populations that are similar in the dimensions just listed may be more likely to 
intermarry and mix socially than populations that are diverse.  This mixing could by itself 
reduce any inequality in the groups’ initial endowments, and would also likely be 
associated with an absence of institutions that magnify ethnic, racial, or economic 
distinctions.  Countries in which people feel a strong sense of kinship with other citizens 
might also be expected to more actively redistribute income or promote economic 
mobility. 
 
The first heterogeneity measure we use is ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et 
al (2003).   This is the probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to 
the same ethnic group.  Alesina et al. find that higher ethnic fractionalization is robustly 
correlated with poor government performance on a variety of dimensions. 
 
We create a second measure of fractionalization using the data in the matrix,   




w −∑ , 
 
where wi is the fraction of a country’s ancestors coming from country i.  Unlike the ethnic 
fractionalization index, the historic fractionalization index does not take into account 
ethnic groups composed of people who came from several source countries, such as 
African Americans, but instead differentiates among, for example, Ghanaian, Senegalese, 
Angolan, and other ancestors of current residents of the United States.  As Alesina et al. 
point out, individual self-identification with ethnic groups can change as result of 
economic, social or political forces.  Thus ethnicity has a significant endogenous 
component that is absent in the case of historical fractionalization.  
 
Ethnic and historical fractionalization are almost uncorrelated (correlation 
coefficient .15). In particular, a large number of African countries have values of ethnic 
fractionalization near one but historical fractionalization near zero.  The reason is that in 
these countries there is fractionalization based on tribal affiliation that is unrelated to the 
movement of people over current international borders over the last 500 years.  There are 
also several countries (Haiti, Jamaica, Argentina, Israel, the United States) that have a 
high historic fractionalization because they contain immigrants from many different 
countries, but a low level of ethnic fractionalization because immigrant groups from 
similar countries are viewed has having a single ethnicity. 
 
  The third measure of heterogeneity we use is “cultural diversity” as constructed 
by Fearon (2003).  Fearon’s measure is similar in spirit to the ethnic heterogeneity   22
measure described above, but goes further in making an additional adjustment for 
different degrees of dissimilarity (as measured by linguistic distance) among the ethnic 
groups in a country’s population.  Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009), using a 
similar measure, find that higher linguistic heterogeneity predicts a lower degree of 
government income redistribution.   
 
  Our final measure of heterogeneity is similar in approach to Fearon’s, but instead 
of using the language that a country’s residents speak today, we use data on the languages 
spoken in the countries inhabited by their ancestors in 1500, according to our matrix.   
Differences in language may directly impede mixing of people from different source 
countries.   In addition, linguistic closeness may well be proxying for other dimensions of 
culture (such as religion) that could have similar impacts on the degree of mixing among 
a country’s constituent populations and/or the openness of institutions.
25   For these 
reasons, historical diversity in languages of a country’s ancestors may have an impact on 
inequality that lasts long after the residents of a country have come to speak the same 
language.  We call the variable we create historical linguistic fractionalization (Our 
methodology and data are described in Appendix C). 
 
  Table 10 presents regressions of income inequality, as measured by the gini 
coefficient, on our various measures of heterogeneity.    The first four columns compare 
the four measures of heterogeneity described above.   Cultural (linguistic) diversity is 
statistically insignificant.  By contrast, the two variables that use the matrix to measure 
historical heterogeneity, historical fractionalization and historical linguistic 
fractionalization, as well as ethnic fractionalization enter very significantly with the 
expected positive sign.  It is notable that in each case the measure of diversity based on 
historic variation performs better than the corresponding measure based on the current 
variation.  For example, distance among the languages spoken by people’s ancestors 
predicts inequalities today far better than does distance among the languages spoken by 
those people themselves.  In the case of variation in language, much of the superior 
predictive power is driven by Latin America which in terms of language currently spoken 
does not look very heterogeneous, but does look heterogeneous in terms of historic 
languages.  Patterns of social differentiation which arose during the encounters of people 
from different continents appear to show persistence even after extensive intermixing and 
linguistic homogenization.  Part of the reason for this could be that linguistic distance 
between ancestral populations posed barriers to transmission of technologies within 
countries of a similar kind to those which Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) posit for genetic 
distance in international diffusion of technology. 
 
   The next four columns of Table 10 repeat these regressions, controlling for the 
mean and standard deviation of the state history measures, as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
                                                 
25 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) use genetic distance, a measure of the time since two populations shared a 
common ancestor, as an indicator of cultural similarity between countries. They argue that genetic distance 
determines the ability of countries to learn from each other, and show that it predicts income gaps among 
pairs of countries.  Ethnic distance and genetic distance are closely related in practice, as shown by Cavalli-
Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995).   23
9.
26  The somewhat surprising finding here is that variation in terms of state history 
dominates the other forms of heterogeneity that we examine.  None of the other four 
measures of heterogeneity is statistically significant.  Variation in early development 
among a country’s people is far more important than more standard forms of 
heterogeneity (in language or ethnicity) as an explanation for inequality.  Similarly, 
variation in the linguistic background of a country’s ancestors, despite its surprising 
predictive power relative to that of present languages spoken, is not important once one 
controls for variation in early development.  
 
 
3.3   Source Country Early Development as a Determinant of Relative Income 
 
  The results in Tables 9 and 10 show that heterogeneity in the historical 
background of a country’s residents is correlated with income inequality today.  A 
number of mechanisms could produce such a correlation.  One simple theory is that when 
people with high and low statehist are mixed together, the high statehist people have 
some advantage which leads them to percolate up to the top of the income distribution, 
and then there is enough persistence that their descendants are still there hundreds of 
years later.  A second theory is that situations in which high and low statehist people are 
mixed together tended to occur in cases of colonialization and/or slavery, and that in 
these circumstances high statehist people were able to create institutions that led groups 
at the top of the income distribution to remain there.  We do not propose to test these 
theories against each other.  Instead we test an auxiliary prediction that follows from 
either of them: specifically, in countries with a high standard deviation of statehist, it is 
the ethnic groups that come from high statehist countries that tend to be at the top of the 
income distribution.  Confirming this prediction would give us additional confidence that 
the link between the standard deviations of statehist and the current level of inequality is 
not spurious.   
 
  To test this prediction, we looked for accounts of socio-economic heterogeneity 
by country or region of ancestral origin in the ten countries in our sample having the 
highest standard deviation of statehist.  It is in countries where statehist is highly variable 
where we would be most likely to find differences in outcomes among nationality groups 
with different values of statehist.  The countries are listed in Table 11.  Not surprisingly, 
all are former colonies, seven of them in the Americas.  Of the latter, three are in Central 
America, three in South America, and one in the Caribbean.  We also list in Table 11 the 
United States, which has the 17
th highest standard deviation of statehist in the sample, 
and is of particular interest due to its size, economic importance, and good data 
availability. 
 
  For each country in the table we first show the breakdown of the population in 
terms of origin countries or groups of similar countries, according to the matrix.  We then 
                                                 
26 To save space, we don’t report parallel exercises using the standard deviation of agyears.  In Section 3.3, 
we also focus on statehist.  Tables 2, 3, and 4 show that statehist and agyears have similar explanatory 
power, and we accord slight priority to statehist because of its more nuanced tracking of 1500 years of 
social history (see our discussion comparing the two measures in Section 2).   24
show the weighted average value of statehist for each origin country or group.  The next 
three columns are based on information about the current ethnic breakdown in the 
country.  Ethnic groups as currently identified sometimes correspond to individual origin 
groups, but are often combinations, frequently labeled mestizos, mulatto, or creole.  For 
each current ethnic group, we then present estimates of average statehist and the relative 
value of current income, listed as high, middle and low or high, upper middle, lower 
middle, and low.  To estimate statehist for a mixed ethnic group we use the assumptions 
underlying the matrix that relate mixed groups to source populations.  For example, the 
group termed “colored” in South Africa is assumed to have half of its ancestors coming 
in equal proportions from five European countries (England, Portugal, and Afrikaner 
source countries Netherlands, France and Germany) and the other half in unequal 
proportions from South Africa itself (35%), India (10%) and Indonesia (5%).  These 
assumptions are reported in the region appendices describing the construction of the 
matrix.    
 
Leaving details to Appendix D, we note immediately that the ordering of statehist 
values and the ordering of socio-economic status in Table 11 has at least some 
correspondence in every country.  For nine of the eleven countries listed—Fiji, Cape 
Verde, Guyana, Paraguay, Panama, South Africa, Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua  —
the socio-economic ordering perfectly dovetails with that of statehist values.  In two 
countries—Trinidad and Tobago and the United States—there are discrepancies in the 
orderings of Asians and “Whites,” with Chinese and (S. Asian) Indians having lower 
incomes than Whites in the first country despite having higher statehist, while Asians in 
general have higher incomes than Whites in the U.S. despite lower average statehist.   For 
the U.S., there is a further discrepancy in that “Black” Americans have lower average 
incomes than American Indians and Alaska Natives, despite having somewhat higher 
average statehist values.  While no statistical significance should be attached to the 
counts just mentioned, since the categorizations are quite broad and require some 
judgments to be made, the general pattern clearly supports the expectation. 
 
A few patterns are noteworthy.  Paraguay and El Salvador are representative of 
the many Latin American countries in which the main identifiable groupings, listed in 
order of both socio-economic status and of average statehist, are European, mestizo, and 
Amerindian.  Three of the represented countries— Panama, Nicaragua and Brazil—add a 
group of largely African descent to this tri-partite pattern.  In each of the latter countries, 
the White group remains on top and the Amerindian group on the bottom.  The Black 
group, with higher statehist than the Amerindians,
27 is variously found on approximate 
par with the mestizos (Nicaragua) or between the mestizo and Amerindian groups 
(Panama).  In fact in Brazil, mestizos, Blacks, and Amerindians are classified as low 
since data that discriminates more carefully between them is unavailable. 
 
In two of the other represented countries of the Americas—Guyana and Trinidad 
and Tobago—there are substantial populations of South Asian origin.  In Trinidad and 
                                                 
27 This is due to the existence of some states in Africa before 1500 but their absence in the Americas 
outside of Mexico, Guatemala and the Andes.  Note that the situation is reversed in some cases, for instance 
the indigenous people of South Africa have a lower statehist value than do those of Mexico and Peru.   25
Tobago, the socio-economic positioning of this group is lower than predicted by their 
average statehist.  This result, contradicting our general hypothesis, may be related to the 
economic hard times on which South Asia itself had fallen by the 19
th Century 
(mentioned in Section 2.4) and the manner in which millions were brought from that 
region to the Caribbean to work in indentured servitude after Britain outlawed slavery.   
Consistent with the expectations based on their homelands’ state histories, however, 
people of South Asian ancestry occupy middle or upper-middle socio-economic positions 
in Guyana and also in two of the three non-Americas examples, South Africa and Fiji.  
 
Of the two African countries represented in Table 11, Cape Verde began as a 
Portuguese plantation economy employing slaves brought from the African mainland.  At 
the time of the country’s independence from Portugal, in 1975, the society was described 
as being stratified along color lines, with people of darker complexion usually found in 
the lower class and people of lighter complexion constituting the “bourgeoisie” (Meintel, 
1984; Lobban, 1995).  The correlation between complexion and socioeconomic class is 
consistent with our proposed explanation of the correlation between standard deviation of 
statehist and the gini coefficient seen in Tables 9 and 10.  In South Africa, the major 
population categories are Black African, White, “colored” (with both European and either 
African, Indian, or Malay ancestors), and Indian or Asian.  The socio-economic standings 
of these groups today remain heavily influenced by the history of European settlement 
and subordination of the local population, and partly as a result, the average incomes for 
those in the four groupings are ordered exactly in accord with the ordering of average 
statehist.   
 
The only case in Table 11 not located in the Americas or Africa is Fiji, whose 
population is classified by government statisticians as indigenous (55.0%), Indian 
(41.0%) and other (mainly European and Chinese, 4.0%).  Average household incomes 
per adult in the three groups are ordered identically to average statehist values.  Although 
the reported income gap between the Indian and native Fijian populations is far smaller 
than the difference in statehist, the government statisticians comment that the incomes of 
Indo-Fijians are probably undercounted, since much of it comes from private business 
activities likely to be underreported.  
 
Turning finally to the U.S., the Census Bureau reports a breakdown of the 
population into White non-Hispanic, Hispanic any race, Black, Asian, American Indian 
and Alaska Native, and other small categories.  These groups’ reported median incomes 
have the same ordering as their average statehist values, with the exception of the higher 
Asian than White income and the higher American Indian than Black income.  The 
simple correlation between the five statehist and the five income values (as reported in 
Appendix D), with equal weighting on all observations, is 0.741.  
 
  On balance, the evidence from the ten countries with the highest internal variation 
of statehist and from the seventeenth-ranking United States appears to support the idea 
that correlation between within-country differences in income and corresponding 
differences in the early development indicator statehist at least partially account for the 
predictive power of the standard deviation of statehist in the Table 9 and 10 regressions.    26
Indeed, in this section we have found within countries (as the previous section found 
between countries) that there is considerable persistence and reproduction of income 
differences which appears to reflect social differences dating back up to half a 
millennium.  To be sure, in the majority of cases just discussed differences in societal 
capabilities during the era of European expansion played themselves out to a considerable 
degree in the form of outright dominance of some over others, including appropriation of 
land, control of government and monopoly of armed force, and involuntary movement of 
millions of people between macro-regions to meet the conquering population’s labor 
demands.  How persistent early differences would have proven to be in the absence of the 
exercise of raw power is a question that goes beyond the scope of our paper.  The point 







Conquest, colonialism, migration, slavery, and epidemic disease reshaped the 
world that existed before the era of European expansion.  Over the last 500 years, there 
have been dramatic movements of people, institutions, cultures, and languages among the 
world’s major regions. These movements clearly have implications for the course of 
economic development.  Existing literature has already made a good start at examining 
how institutions were transferred between regions and the long lasting economic effects 
of these transfers.  However the human side of the story – the relationship between where 
the ancestors of a country’s current population lived and current outcomes – has received 
relatively little attention, in part due to the absence of suitable data.   In this paper, we 
introduce a “world migration matrix” to account for international movements of people 
since the year 1500.  We use the matrix to document some major features of world 
migration history such as the bi-modality of the distribution of indigenous and non-
indigenous people by country and the variations in the primary source regions for 
immigrant-populated countries.   
      
In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate the utility of the migration data by 
using it to re-visit the hypothesis that early development of agrarian societies and their 
sociopolitical correlates—states—conferred developmental advantages that remain 
relevant today.  We confirm that in a global sample, countries on whose territories 
agriculture and states developed earlier have higher incomes.  But we conjecture that 
people who moved from one region to another carried the human capabilities built up in 
that area with them.  We find that re-calculating state history and agriculture measures for 
each country as weighted averages by place of origin of their people’s ancestors 
considerably improves the fit of these regressions.  We also find that heterogeneity of 
early development, holding the mean level constant, is associated with higher per capita 
income. We interpret this finding as indicating that the effect of spillovers of growth-
promoting characteristics between groups having different early development histories 
more than compensated for any negative effect on growth of higher inequality due to 
heterogeneity.     27
 
In Part 3, we show that the heterogeneity of a country’s population in terms of the 
early development of its ancestors as of 1500 is strongly correlated with income 
inequality.   We also show that heterogeneity with respect to country of ancestry or with 
respect to the ancestral language does a better job than does current linguistic or ethnic 
heterogeneity in predicting income inequalities today.  As an additional test of the theory 
that early development conferred lasting advantage, we show that the rankings of ethnic 
or racial groups within a country’s income distribution are strongly correlated with the 
average levels of groups’ early development indicators.   
 
The overall finding of our paper is that the origins of a country’s population – 
more specifically, where the ancestors of the current population lived some 500 years ago 
– matters for economic outcomes today.  Having ancestors who lived in places with early 
agricultural and political development is good for income today, both at the level of 
country averages and in terms of an individual’s position within a country’s income 
distribution.  Exactly why the origins of the current population matter is a question on 
which we can only speculate at this point.  People who moved across borders brought 
with them human capital, cultures, genes, institutions, and languages.   People who came 
from areas which developed early evidently brought with them versions of one or more of 
these things that were conducive to higher income.  Future research will have to sort out 
which ones were the most significant. The fact that early development explains an ethnic 
group’s position within a country’s income distribution suggests that “good institutions” 
coming from regions of early development cannot be the whole story, although it does 
not prove that institutions are not of enormous importance.  More research is also needed 
to understand how early development led to the creation of growth promoting 
characteristics (whatever these turn out to be), how these characteristics were transmitted 
so persistently over the centuries, as well as the process by which these characteristics are 
transferred between populations of high and low early development.  Our hope is that the 
availability of a compilation of data on the reconfiguration of country populations since 
1500 will make it easier to address such issues in future research.  
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U.S. and Canada  1.12  315 281 9.14 .0325 1.00 0.00
Mexico and Central 
America 5.80  137 23.6 16.8 .602 .846
15.0
The Caribbean  0.186  34.4 185 17.8 .0367 .381 2.05
South America  7.65  349 45.6 10.5 .227 .988 0.927
Europe 77.7  680 8.76 16.0 .975 .535 578
North Africa/West and 
Central Asia  35.5  530 14.9 14.6 .939 .958
22.0
South Asia  103  1,320 12.8 12.9 .999 .990 13.2
East Asia  132  1,490 11.3 11.6 1.00 .976 36.7
Southeast Asia  18.7  555 29.7 28.5 .946 .988 6.50
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.200  22.9 114 3.68 .0322 1.00 0.00
Sub Saharan Africa  38.3  656 17.1 19.5 .981 .862 103
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Table 2: Historical Determinants of Current Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indep. Var.  Dependent Variable: ln(GDP per capita 2000) 












   























No.  obs.  136 136 136 147 147 147 
R-squared  0.060 0.219 0.271 0.080 0.240 0.293 
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Table 3: Robustness to Alternative Measures of Migration, Descent, and Language 
  
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
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No.  obs.  136  136  147 147 129 139 138 138 138 113 113 113 
R-squared  0.122  0.230  0.127 0.259 0.286 0.281 0.458 0.572 0.526 0.195 0.418 0.393   34
 
Table 4: Historical and Geographical Determinants of Current Income  
 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




2.38 1.32 2.21 1.75 1.31 1.24 
(0.40) (0.43) (0.41) (0.55) (0.42) (0.42) 
Absolute 
Latitude 
 0.0386      0.0337 
 (0.0062)      (0.0084) 
Landlocked     -0.628    -0.558 
     (0.272)    (0.172) 
Eurasia       0.594    -0.327 
       (0.286)  (0.247) 
Climate       0.609  0.235 
       (0.096)  (0.121) 
Constant  7.44 6.94 7.65 7.44 6.92 6.99 
 (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) 
No.  Obs.  111 111 111 111 111 111 
R-squared  0.294 0.527 0.339 0.334 0.494 0.593 
 
Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




0.313 0.172 0.289 0.219 0.178 0.153 
(0.048) (0.053) (0.051) (0.062) (0.060) (0.054) 
Absolute 
Latitude 
 0.0393      0.0404 
 (0.0058)      (0.0087) 
Landlocked     -0.500    -0.577 
     (0.236)    (0.160) 
Eurasia       0.631    -0.172 
     (0.250)  (0.237) 
Climate         0.516  0.053 
       (0.101)  (0.133) 
Constant  6.85 6.61 7.07 7.04 6.74 6.80 
 (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
No.  Obs.  116 116 116 116 116 116 
R-squared  0.293 0.523 0.320 0.334 0.426 0.563 
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Table 5:  Alternative Measures of Early Historical Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Indep. Var.  Dependent Variable: ln(GDP per capita 2000) 
Geo Conditions  0.752         




  0.952        
  (0.069)        
Bio Conditions     0.746       




    0.947      
    (0.074)      
Technology 
Index 1 CE 
     0.0924     




Index 1 CE 
      2.51    
      (0.59)    
Technology 
Index 1500 CE 
       1.55   




Index 1500 CE 
        3.26 
        ( 0 . 3 0 )  
Constant  8.42 8.19 8.43 8.21 8.42 6.41 7.77 6.54 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.28) (0.46) (0.20) (0.21) 
Observations  105 105 105 105 125 125 114 114 





Table 6: Historical Determinants of Current Institutions 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indep. Var.  Executive 
Constraints 
Expropriation Risk  Government 
Effectiveness 
Statehist  0.158  0.658  0.445  
(0.274)  (0.287)  (0.271)  
Ancestry Adjusted 
Statehist 
 0.670   1.33    1.32 
 (0.309)   (0.33)    (0.30) 
Constant 1.95  1.71  3.89  3.51  -0.180  -0.604 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)  (0.114)  (0.118) 
No.  obs.  141 141 111 111 144 144 
R-squared  0.002 0.033 0.047 0.134 0.019 0.123 
 
Note: All dependent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one.   37
 


















































































































No. obs.  152  152  152 
R-squared 0.631  0.584 0.681 
Note: In regression 1, the independent variables are the shares of the population in each 
country originating in each region.  In regression 2, the independent variables are 
dummies for a country being located in a particular region.  In regression 3 the 
independent variables are both of the above.     38
Table 8: The Effect of Heterogeneity in Early Development on Current Income 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indep. Var.  Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per capita 2000) 
Standard Deviation of 
Statehist 
1.40  2.02      
(0.91)  (0.78)      
Ancestry Adjusted Statehist    2.08      
 (0.37)        
Standard Deviation of 
Agyears 
   0.377  0.312    
   (0.108)  (0.094)    
Ancestry Adjusted Agyears      0.260    
     (0.037)    
Standard Deviation of 
Source Region Coefficients 
     0.414  0.0844 
     (0.064)  (0.0636) 
Mean Source Region 
Coefficient 
      0.982 
      (0.067) 
Constant  8.33 7.38 8.21 6.86 8.33 7.26 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09) 
No.  obs.  136 136 147 147 152 152 
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Table 9: Historical Determinants of Current Inequality 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indep. Var.  Dependent variable: Gini Coefficient 
Standard Deviation of 
statehist 
0.456  0.408      
(0.088)  (0.084)      
Ancestry Adjusted 
statehist 
 -0.148        
 (0.036)        
Standard Deviation of 
agyears 
   0.0512  0.0571    
   (0.0121)  (0.0108)    
Ancestry Adjusted 
agyears 
     -0.0217    
     (0.0052)    
Standard Deviation of 
Source Region 
Coefficients 
     0.0207  0.0453 
     (0.0166)  (0.0153) 
Mean Source Region 
Coefficient 
      -0.0743 
      (0.0089) 
Constant  0.375 0.445 0.381 0.493 0.413 0.498 
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.031) (0.011) (0.016) 
No.  obs.  135 135 140 140 141 141 
R-squared  0.140 0.267 0.108 0.260 0.018 0.365 
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Table 10: Ethnic, Linguistic, and Historical Determinants of Current Inequality 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Indep. Var.  Dependent variable: Gini Coefficient from WIID2 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.117      0.0517     
(0.037)      (0.0355)    
Historical 
Fractionalization 
  0.134       -0.0116    
 (0.034)       (0.0489)     
Cultural  Diversity     0.0354      0.0126   




    0.168      0.0460 
    (0.039)      (0.0721)
Standard Deviation 
of Statehist 
     0.392  0.435  0.401  0.310 
        (0.085) (0.124) (0.086) (0.167) 
Ancestry Adjusted 
Statehist 
        -0.130 -0.148 -0.151 -0.149 
        (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) 
Constant  0.367 0.382 0.407 0.385 0.415 0.446 0.441 0.445 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.033) (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) 
No.  obs.  132 135 132 135 132 135 132 135 
R-squared  0.073 0.101 0.005 0.115 0.276 0.267 0.275 0.269 
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Table 11: Statehist and relative income for ancestry groups and current ethnic groups  
 
# Country  Standard   





















1 Fiji  .346  .441 European  2.2 0.693 Other
31 4 0.745 High 
Indian 45.0 0.688 Indo-Fijian 41 0.688 Middle 
Fijian 52.1 0.000 Fijian  55 0.000 Low 
2 Cape 
Verde 
.301 .51  Portuguese  41.4 0.723 White  1.0 0.723 High 
African 58.6 0.142 Creole    71.0 0.473 Middle 
 Black  28.0 0.142 Low 
3 Guyana  .293  .540 Chinese  0.7 0.906 Chinese  0.3 0.906 High 
Portuguese 1.3 0.723 Portuguese 0.4 0.723 Middle 
 Mixed
32 11.2 0.410 Middle 
S. Asian  54.0 0.677 East-Indian  51.9 0.677 Middle 
African 39.0 0.142 Black  30.8 0.142 Middle 
Guyanese 5.0 0.000 Amerindian  5.3 0.000  Low 
4 Panama  .292  .548 Chinese  1.5 0.906 Chinese  2.0 0.906 High 
S. Asian  4.0 0.677 White  10.0 0.578 High 
European 45.2 0.578 Mestizo  68.0 0.281 Upper 
Middle 
                                                 
28Source: UN World Income Inequality Database (2007), except: Cape Verde – World Development Indicators, 2001 
29 Computed from Matrix. 
30 Based on: Fiji – Household Survey 2002-03; Cape Verde – Census 1950 (quoted in Lobban, R., “Cape Verde: Crioulo Colony to Independent Nation”, 199); 
Guyana – Census 1980; Paraguay – Census 2002; Panama – Fearon, J. D. Data set described in "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country". Journal of Economic 
Growth 8, 2 (June 2003): 195-222.; South Africa – Household Survey 2005; Trinidad and Tobago - Continuous Sample Survey of Population; El Salvador – CIA 
Factbook; Nicaragua – CIA Factbook; Venezuela – CIA Factbook,; United States - U.S. Census, Vintage 2004 
31 Europeans, Chinese 
32 ½ East Indian, ½ African   42
African 13.0 0.150 mixed  West-
Indian 
(Black) 
13.0 0.150 Lower 
Middle 
Panamanian 35.7 0.000 Amerindian  6.0 0.000 Low 
5 Paraguay  .291  .552 European, 
non-Spanish
5.5 0.749 European 
(incl. 
Spanish) 
3.8 0.575 High 
Spanish 46.8 0.562 Mestizo 94.7 0.281 Middle 
Paraguayan 
/ Brazilian 
46.1 0.000 Amerindian 1.1 0.000 Low 
6 South 
Africa 
.289 .565  European  18.0 0.710 White  9.2 0.710 High 
Indian /  
S. Asian 
3.4 0.670 Indian / 
Asian 




78.7 0.000 Colored 
(mixed)
33 




79.4 0.000 Low 
7 Brazil  .288  .566 Japanese  0.8 0.834 Asian  0.4 0.834 High 
European 74.4 0.715 White  53.7 0.715 Middle 
 Mixed
34 38.5 0.384 Low 
African 15.7 0.086 Black  6.2 0.086 Low 




.284  .402  Chinese 1.5 0.906 Chinese 0.2 0.906 Upper 
Middle 
European 7.1 0.671 White  / 
Caucasian 
0.7 0.671 High 
S. Asian  45.4 0.677 Indian  40.5 0.677 Low 
                                                 
33 .35 African, .1 S. Asian, .05 Indonesian, .1 UK, .1 Netherlands, .1 France, .1 Germany and .1 Portugal 
34 .506 European, .239 Amerindian, .255 African   43
African 46.0 0.166 Mixed
35 14.9 0.504 Lower 
Middle 
         African  43.5 0.166 Low 
9 El 
Salvador 
.281 .484  Spanish  50.0 0.562 White  9.0 0.562 High 
Salvadoran 50.0 0.000 Mestizo  90.0 0.281 Middle 
 Amerindian  1.0 0.000 Low 
10 Nicaragua  .277  .544 European  51.0 0.568 White  17.0 0.568 High 
African 9.0 0.150 African 
(Creole) 
9.0 0.150 Middle 
Nicaraguan 40.0 0.000 Mestizo 69.0 0.281 Middle 
 Amerindian  5.0 0.000 Low 
17 United 
States 
.232 .464  European  75.7 0.648 White  not 
Hispanic 
67.4 0.650 Upper 
Middle 




6.3 0.433 Hispanic of 
any race 

















                                                 
35 1/3 African, 1/3 S. Asian, 1/3 European. 
36 Includes Hawaii and Alaska   44  45
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Appendix A: World Migration Matrix, 1500 – 2000
* 
 
The goal of the matrix is to identify where the ancestors of the permanent 
residents of today’s countries were living in 1500 C.E.  In this abbreviated 
description, we address some major conceptual issues relevant to the 
construction of the matrix and identify some of the main sources of information 
consulted. 
 
The migration matrix is a table in which both row and column headings are the 
names of presently existing countries, and cell entries are estimates of the 
proportion of the ancestors of those now permanently residing in the country 
identified in the row heading who lived in the country identified by the column 
heading in 1500.  An ancestor is treated as having lived in what is now, say, 
Indonesia, if the place they resided in that year is within the borders of Indonesia 
today. 
 
When ancestors could be identified only as part of an ethnic group that lived in a 
region now straddling the borders of two or more present-day countries, we try to 
estimate the proportion of that group living in each country and then allocate 
ancestry accordingly.  For example, if a given ancestor is known to have been a 
“Gypsy” (Roma) but if we have no information on which country he or she lived in 
during the year 1500, we apply an assumption (see Appendix B) regarding the 
proportion of Gypsies who lived in Greece, Romania, Turkey, etc., as of 1500.   
The Gypsy example is one of many illustrating the fact that most of our data 
sources organize their information around ethnic groups rather than territory of 
origin.  While the use of information on ethnicity was unavoidable in the process 
of constructing the matrix, it was not a focus of attention in its own right.   
 
In cases in which ancestors are known to have migrated more than once 
between 1500 and 2000, countries of intervening residence are not indicated in 
the matrix.  For example, an Israeli whose parents lived in Argentina but whose 
grandparents arrived in Argentina from Ukraine, is listed as having had ancestors 
in Ukraine.  
 
People of mixed ancestry are common in many countries, for example people of 
mixed Amerindian and Spanish ancestry in Mexico.  Such individuals are treated 
as having a certain proportion of their ancestry deriving from each source 
country.  When members of such groups are reported to account for 30% or 
more of a country’s population, we searched the specialized scientific literature 
on genetic admixture for the best available estimates.  For smaller mixed groups 
we base estimates on the stated or implicit assumptions of conventional sources 
or on extrapolation from similar countries in which we had genetic estimates. Our 
                                                 
* This is an abbreviated version of Appendix B, which is linked to region summaries and the data set itself.  
All can be found at  http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/ . 
   49
assumed breakdowns of mixed populations for each country are discussed in 
Appendix B. 
 
Because our interest is in the possible impact of its people’s origins on each 
country’s economic performance, we try to identify the origins of long-term 
residents only, thus leaving out guest or temporary workers. Very little data is 
available about the duration of stay of most temporary workers, so we made 
educated guesses as to what portion of the originally temporary residents have 
become permanent, understood as having been in the country at least ten years 
as of 2000. 
 
The matrix includes entries on all countries existing in 2000 having populations of 
one half million or larger.  A country is included as a source country for ancestors 
of the people of another country if at least 0.5% of all ancestors alive in 1500 are 
estimated to have lived there.  Some entries smaller than 0.5% are found in the 
matrix, but these occur as a result of special decompositions applied to 
populations that our sources identify by ethnic group rather than by country of 
origin—e.g. Gypsies, Africans (descended from slaves, especially in the 
Americas), and Ashkenazi Jews.  Appendix B details the method of assigning 
fractions of these populations to individual source countries. 
Some of the more important sources from which data were drawn for the 
construction of the matrix are listed below.  See Appendix B and its regional sub 
appendices for other sources and details. 
Columbia Encyclopedia (online edition) 
CIA World Factbook 
Countriesquest.com 
Encyclopædia Britannica (online edition) 
Everyculture.com 
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies 
MSN Encarta Encyclopedia (online edition) 
Nationsencyclopedia.com 
World Christian Database (Original source for WCE) 
World Christian Encyclopedia 